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I. INTRODUCTION
The term "countertrade" refers to barter and barter-like interna-
tional trade. International barter has always existed and has not van-
ished even from the post-World War II multilateral payments system.'
To the contrary, countertrade has grown rapidly2 and spread widely,3
prompting commentators to affirm that it has become a permanent fea-
ture of the world economy.'
1. See, eg., I. OUTrERS-JAEGER, THE DEVELOPMENT IMPACT OF BARTER IN DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES 11-15 (1979); Carey & McLean, The United States, Countertrade and Third
World Trade, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 441, 442-44 (1986).
2. See, eg., Comment, The Need for a United States Countertrade Policy, 7 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 113, 114 (1985). The magnitude of countertrade is difficult to assess because reliable
data are scarce. See, eg., de Miramon, Countertrade: A Modernized Barter System, OECD
OBSERVER, Jan. 1982, at 12, 12. Thus, "eistimates of the share of world trade accounted for
by countertrade vary tremendously." BUSINESS INT'L CORP., RESEARCH REP. No. 154,
THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF GLOBAL COUNTERTRADE 14 (1984). Estimates range
from 1%-40% of world trade. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVEL-
OPMENT, COUNTERTRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRY PRACTICES 11 (1985) [hereinafter
OECD (1985)]. See, eg., id. at 12 (OECD estimate: 4.8% of world exports); BUSINESS INT'L
CORP., supra, at 14 (GATT estimate: 8% of world merchandise trade); Verdun, Are Govern.
mentally Imposed Countertrade Requirements Violations of the GA777, 11 YALE J. INT'L L.
191, 192 (1985) (IMF estimate: 5%-10% of world trade); Lochner, Guide to Countertrade and
International Barter, 19 INT'L LAw. 725, 726 & n.1, 733 & n.48 (Department of Commerce
official's estimate: 20%-30% of world trade). The growth of countertrade may be accelerat-
ing, see, eg., Comment, supra, at 122-23; but see Watson, Trading in a Cold Climate as the
Competition Hots Up, TRADE FIN., Sept. 1987, at 37, 39 (some traders see stagnant counter-
trade market), and countertrade terms are hardening, see, e.g., de Miramon, supra, at 13.
Countertrade has "gathered considerable momentum," OECD (1985), supra, at 9, and some
experts predict continued growth, Comment, supra, at 124. But see Watson, supra, at 39
(some traders see countertrade at plateau).
3. Long a staple of East-West trade, countertrade has recently assumed an important
place in trade between industrialized countries and developing countries. E.g., BUSINESS
INT'L CORP., supra note 2, at 16-17. During the period 1980-1985, 61 countries imposed
countertrade requirements at one time or another. Assessment of the Effects of Barter and
Countertrade Transactions on U.S. Industries, USITC Pub. 1766, Inv. No. 333-185, at 46
(1985) [hereinafter USITC (1985)].
4. E.g., Carey & McLean, supra note 1, at 441.
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This sudden prominence has aroused concern that countertrade dis-
torts multilateral trade and threatens the integrity of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 5 which provides the legal
framework for international trade. This Article argues that such concern
is unwarranted. Part II of this Article defines countertrade and separates
it into three categories. Part III then develops a defense of countertrade
as a second-best policy that enhances international trade. Part IV applies
this economic analysis to the legal analysis of countertrade under the
GATT. Part V delineates the appropriate institutional response to these
analyses. Part VI concludes that countertrade as a second-best policy
supplements and complements the GATT system and does not violate
GATT provisions.
II. DEFINING COUNTERTRADE
The term "countertrade" describes a "multitude" of commercial ar-
rangements with a "bewildering array of names." 6 As a result, "[there
is no universally accepted definition of countertrade,"7 although defini-
tions abound.' For the purposes of this Article, countertrade is the con-
tractually explicit linkage of commercial import and export
transactions. 9
Neither is there a set of agreed-upon terms for the various types of
countertrade.10 All countertrade transactions, however, may be de-
scribed according to six variables: relative duration, size of deal, number
of contracts, form of payment, value relationship of deliveries, and rela-
tionship of countertraded products." Using these variables, counter-
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. Other GAT documents appear
in CONTRACrING PARTIEs To THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BAsic
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DocuM sEs (periodic supplements) [hereinafter BISD].
6. Banks, The Economics and Politics of Countertrade, WORLD ECON., June 1983, at
159, 159.
7. Carey & McLean, supra note 1, at 441.
8. Guyot, Countertrade Contracts in International Busine, 20 INT'L LAW. 921, 922-23
(1986) (listing definitions).
9. See, ag., Banks, supra note 6, at 159. Thus, arrangements such as equity joint ven-
tures and military offset agreements, see generally Guyot, supra note 8 at 943-58, are beyond
the scope of this article. See BusINESS INT'L CORP., supra note 2, at 67 (offset distinguished
from commercial forms of countertrade); Comment, supra note 2, at 121 n.60 (offset not
contractual).
10. Lochner, supra note 2, at 728.
11. L. WELT, COUNTERTRADE BUSINESS PRACTICES FOR TODAY'S WORLD MARKET 14
(1982). For a summary of contractual considerations, see id. at 32-39; Hober, Countertradc
Negotiating the Terms, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Mar. 1987 (Part I), Apr. 1987 (Part 11). For
annotated sample contracts, see Koschik, Structuring Barter and Countertrade Transactions, in
19881
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trade may be divided into three categories: classical barter, commercial
compensation, and industrial compensation.
12
A. Classical Barter
In classical barter transactions, there is only one contract, and no
money changes hands."3 Also, there is no necessary relationship between
the products traded, the value of reciprocal deliveries must balance in
some manner, and the time frame is usually short. Pure barter is the
most primitive form of international trade; it depends on simultaneity,
exact equality of value, and strict coincidence of wants.14 Despite the ad
hoc nature of pure barter, countries such as the Philippines and Egpyt
use it often.'" Moreover, a variant of pure barter called "swap" can save
transaction costs in commodities trade. Recently, Mexico was slated to
ship oil to Western Europe, and the Soviet Union was preparing to send
oil to Cuba. The participants worked out a swap arrangement sending
Mexican oil to Cuba and Soviet oil to Western Europe. 6
Traders have developed means of overcoming the inflexibility of
pure barter; many countries maintain bilateral clearing arrangements.'
7
An umbrella document specifies which products can be traded, and the
value of imports and exports is tabulated in a "clearing account" so that
no money changes hands at the time of trade. 8 Usually, the bilateral
partners settle the outstanding balance (the "swing") at fixed periods.
Many clearing arrangements permit "switch" trading, in which an
outside trader may alleviate the bilateral swing by taking goods listed for
BARTER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 37-82 (B. Fisher & K. Harte eds. 1985). For diagrams of
typical countertrade transactions, see BUSINESS INT'L CORP., supra note 2, ch. 3. For fourteen
case studies of countertrading entities, see id. ch. 9. Barter-like trade also differs from country
to country and region to region. For a review of national countertrade practices, see id, ch. 10.
For a review of countertrade by region, see BUSINESS INT'L CORP., RESEARCH REPORT No.
160, 101 CHECKLISTS FOR COPING WITH WORLDWIDE COUNTERTRADE PROBLEMS chs. 6-10
(1985). For an in-depth examination of countertrade policies in Latin America, see Carey &
McLean, supra note 1, annex I, at 456.
12. Cf. Guyot, supra note 8, at 925; Banks, supra note 6, at 160-62; de Miramon, supra
note 2, at 13.
13. Guyot, supra note 8, at 925.
14. Id.
15. I. OUTTERS-JAEGER, supra note 1, at 34.
16. USITC (1985), supra note 3, at 45.
17. For a detailed description of bilateral clearing arrangements, see I OUTrERS-JAEGER,
supra note 1, at 38-40, 45-47. For a description of India's experience with bilateral clearing,
see R. BANERjI, THE DEVELOPMENT IMPACT OF BARTER IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: TiE
CASE OF INDIA (1977). For a list of bilateral clearing agreements currently in existence, see
BUSINESS INT'L CORP., supra note 2, at 78-79.
18. See, e.g., Lochner, supra note 2, at 729-30.
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export by the deficit country and selling acceptable goods to the surplus
country.'
9
Classical barter permits trade when at least one party does not have
access to convertible currencies. As a result, barter occupies a significant
place in North-South and South-South trade. Classical barter accounts
for roughly forty percent of all less developed country (LDC) trade.'
B. Commercial Compensation
In commercial compensation, like classical barter, the time frame is
short and the deliveries unrelated; however, the parties trade in cash and
use more than one contract, and the value of reciprocal deliveries need
not balance. These transactions take the form of a contractual triangle:
the principle contract covers a standard cash-for-goods transaction; the
counterpurchase contract specifies the conditions of the seller's obliga-
tion to purchase goods from the buyer; and a third contract, called a
protocol, links the first two sets of contractual obligations. The first two
contracts cover distinct transactions with separate payments.21 The
"counterpurchase ratio" may be any ratio of counterdelivery value to
delivery value.' Usually, the seller can choose counterdeliveries (at mar-
ket or otherwise specified prices) from a list. The counterpurchase con-
tract typically permits the seller to assign its obligation to a third party.3
A deal concluded by General Electric and Romania illustrates the
mechanics of commercial compensation. General Electric agreed to help
build a nuclear reactor for $160 million. The corporation took as pay-
ment $160 million worth of Romanian cement, which was brokered by a
German firm for use in Egypt.24
An important kind of commercial compensation is precompensa-
tion, in which the ultimate seller builds up an evidence account by
purchasing listed export products from a country. 5 The seller then is
free to sell products-up to the value in the evidence account-directly
19. See, eg., Verdun, supra note 2, at 196.
20. See Schwenk, North-South Barter Trade, in BARTER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 94
(B. Fisher & K. Harte eds. 1985). See, eg., Carey & McLean, supra note 1, at 459 (Brazil
channels 30% of its total trade through clearing agreements).
21. Guyot, supra note 8, at 930. See generally Hober, supra note 11.
22. See Guyot, supra note 8, at 930. See generally Hober, supra note 11.
23. Guyot, supra note 8, at 930. For a discussion of methods for disposing of counterde-
liveries, see McVey, Overview of the Commercial Practice of ountertrade, in BARTER IN THE
WORLD ECONoMY 26-28 (B. Fisher & K. Harte eds. 1985) (use in production process, nonpro-
duction in-house use, use by subcontractors, sale to ultimate user, and transfer to trading
company).
24. Lochner, supra note 2, at 740 & n.93.
25. See, eg., BusINEss INT'L CORP., supra note 2, at 59-61 (advance purchase); McVey,
1988]
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into the countertrade-demanding country. Also noteworthy is "positive"
or "reverse" countertrade; in such cases, "the private firm views the
goods that it will be required to purchase as more valuable than hard
currency."26 Most critics of countertrade, however, direct their attention
mainly to counterpurchasing,27 perhaps because it is the most frequently
practiced form of countertrade.28
C. Industrial Compensation
In industrial compensation, as in commercial compensation, parties
may use cash and multiple contracts, and the value of deliveries need not
balance. Industrial compensation transactions, however, involve very
large quantities and very long terms, and are distinguished by deliveries
that are related to counterdeliveries. Buy-back is the quintessential in-
dustrial compensation form; it "involves the sale of plants, equipment or
technology by one party to another and the payment for such sale in the
form of products resulting from the plant, equipment or technology."
29
The best known example of industrial compensation, and perhaps the
largest countertrade deal of all time,30 is the Western Europe-Soviet
Union natural gas pipeline.3" Industrial compensation is used primarily
for technology transfers which foster economic development, 32 and it is
the fastest growing kind of countertrade.33 Perhaps because industrial
compensation is also used by Western firms to obtain scarce raw materi-
als, it is the type of countertrade that faces the least resistance from
Western governments.
34
Countertrade: Commercial Practices, Legal Issues and Policy Dilemmas, 16 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1, 20-22 (1984) (progressive or proactive countertrade).
26. McVey, supra note 25, at 22.
27. See, eg., Walsh, The Effect on Third World Countries of Mandated Countertrade, 19
J. WORLD TRADE L. 592 (1985) (criticizing countertrade but arguing largely in terms of
counterpurchases).
28. E.g., BUSINESS INT'L CORP., supra note 2, at 56.
29. Guyot, supra note 8, at 948 (footnote omitted).
30. Lochner, supra note 2, at 741-42. The $12 billion project will channel 40-50 billion
cubic meters of natural gas annually through 3,000 miles of pipeline between Siberia and West.
erm Europe. Soviets Defend Siberia-to-W. Europe Pipeline Deal, Wash. Post, Dec. 27, 1980, at
D7, col. 3.
31. See Comment, supra note 2, at 120-21.
32. E.g., Guyot, supra note 8, at 949 n.102.
33. L. WELT, supra note 11, at 18.
34. de Miramon, supra note 2, at 12. Western governments subsidize such efforts. See
generally Walsh, The Growth of Develop-for-Import Projects, RESOURCES POL'Y, Dec. 1982,
277. See also L. WELT, supra note 11, at 66; Verdun, supra note 2, at 197.
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I. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS OF
COUNTERTRADE
Countertrade requirements, however, do impose burdens upon
Western-based multinational corporations.35 Also, the GATT envisions
a world trading order characterized by the free flow of goods in return
for cash, but countertrade represents a sharp deviation from the multilat-
eral payments system. As a result, Western governments have been
quick to condemn the use of countertrade by Eastern and Southern
governments. 6
Scholars have given substance to this condemnation by developing a
general equilibrium critique of countertrade. In order to analyze this cri-
tique-as well as any defense-of countertrade, it is necessary to explore
two related political-economic questions. First, why do international
trade actors choose countertrade over the multilateral payments system?
Second, what are the consequences of this choice for third parties and the
world trading order?
A. The General Equilibrium Critique of Countertrade
Most writers attack countertrade as being against the interest of the
immediate parties and as being detrimental to both third parties and the
world trading order.37 In comparison to ordinary cash transactions,
countertrade seems costly. Barter-like transactions are complex;3 there-
fore, negotiation and other transaction costs are high.3 9 As a result, such
transactions slow the trading process' and decrease flexibility.41 Fur-
thermore, countertrade alters the pattern of cash transactions.42 Govern-
ment imposition or encouragement of reciprocal trading appears to
constrict consumption opportunitites and production possibilities.43
35. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
36. See generally BusiNEss INT'L CORP., supra note 2, at 40-52.
37. See, e.g., Verdun, supra note 2, at 201; Walsh, supra note 27, at 596; Banks, supra note
6, at 177.
38. See, eg., Lochner, supra note 2, at 747-50.
39. Id. at 747-48; Verdun, supra note 2, at 202; Banks, supra note 6, at 177 (more admin-
istrative and legal input).
40. Verdun, supra note 2, at 201-02; Banks, supra note 6 at 177.
41. The Impact of Countertrade and Offset Agreements on the US: Economy: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm. on Banking Finance and
Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34 (1984) (hereinafter Impact of Countertrade] (state-
ment of James P. Moore, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce).
42. See Walsh, supra note 27, at 593 (package of countertrade offerings injects additional
competitive element into commercial negotiations).
43. See Verdun, supra note 2, at 202 (production effect); INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RESTRIC-
1988]
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Thus, critics of countertrade hold that "such practices are economically
inefficient."'  Why then do economic actors engage in inefficient prac-
tices? Explains a GATT economist, countertrade is "largely based on a
misapprehension" by the contracting parties of the relevant incentives.
41
The detractors of countertrade also assert that these inefficiencies
reach beyond the countertrading parties; given an equilibrium in world
markets, local distortions will reverberate throughout the system.
The purely economic argument is that bilateralism results in a
generalised contraction of trade and production through trade diver-
sion, resource misallocation and increased transaction costs. Multilat-
eral trade is normally associated with trade imbalances between
trading partners due to international specialisation and differences in
the pattern and magnitude of demand. Any action to reduce dispari-
ties in bilateral trade flows will necessitate a switching of import expen-
diture to higher-cost sources. This will decrease not only the volume
of imports but also the volume of domestic output, as a result of re-
duced demand and increased costs of supply. The depressive effect on
trade and production is compounded by the increased costs of supply.
The costs of a given volume of trade are thereby raised and the number
of transactions possible in a given period of time are reduced.46
Furthermore, it has been suggested that barter-like trade is not only dis-
tortionary, but also inherently discriminatory.47 Some commentators
note the difficulty of monitoring countertrade4 s and assert that these
transactions threaten to undermine the multilateral trade system.49 To
the extent that the GATT regime is itself a public good, practices which
cause GATT norms to deteriorate harm the interests of all nations.
TIONS, noted in BusINESS INT'L CORP., supra note 2, at 33 (countertrade limits choice). See
also Lochner, supra note 2, at 747 (countertrade distortionary); de Miramon, supra note 2, at
14 (same). For a discussion of the gains from trade and from specialization on consumption
and production, see C. KINDLEBERGER & P. LINDERT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS pt. I
(6th ed. 1978).
44. Verdun, supra note 2, at 201.
45. Banks, supra note 6, at 179.
46. Id. at 177. See Verdun, supra note 2, at 201 (countertrade interferes with comparative
advantage); de Miramon, Advantages and Disadvantages of Countertrade, 5 J. COMp. Bus, &
CAPITAL MARKETS L. 347, 351 (1983) ("regression towards bilateralism"); Walsh, Counter-
trade: Not Just for East-West Any More, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 3, 4 (1983) (distorts world
trade flows).
47. Walsh, supra note 46, at 4. See de Miramon, supra note 2, at 14.
48. See, e.g., Lochner, supra note 2, at 749.
49. See, e.g., de Miramon, supra note 2, at 14 ("Extension of (countertrade] to an increas-
ing proportion of international trade would create a special system, alongside the multilateral
system ...."). For a particularly troublesome example along these lines, see Walsh, supra
note 27, at 597 (Malaysian Minister of Finance stated that his country was forced into counter-
trade to compete with Indonesian countertrade program).
[Vol, I I
Countertrade and the GATT
In contrast to the existing multilateral payments system, reciprocal
trade appears to be inflexible, costly, and distortionary. Countertrade
exists outside the multilateral system and is difficult to monitor. Govern-
ment intervention to encourage bilateral trade seemingly creates a global
misallocation of resources. If world markets were in general equilibrium,
countertrade would be inefficient.
B. Defense of Countertrade
However, world markets are not in general equilibrium; distortions
are widespread. 0 "We live in a 'second-best' world, one riddled with
gaps between private and social benefits or costs."51 This fact gives rise
to persistent confusion pervading many contemporary analyses of
countertrade:
Indeed, in many ways countertrade is a contradiction. Although
countertrade undermines multilateral trading, it is the recent failures
of the multilateral trading system which have in part given rise to
countertrade and expedited its growth.... While countertrade can
distort trade, it can also enhance trade.
52
This confusion can be resolved by taking account of market imperfec-
tions explicitly and employing the theory of the second best.
1. The General Theory of the Second Best
The general theory of the second best "states that if there is intro-
duced into a general equilibrium system a constraint which prevents the
attainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the other Paretian condi-
tions are . . . no longer desirable."5 I Therefore, "it is not true that a
situation in which more, but not all, of the optimum conditions are ful-
filled is necessarily, or is even likely to be, superior to a situation in which
fewer are fulfilled."' 4 As applied to international trade, the theory of the
second best states that, even under the assumption that free trade is a
50. C. KINDLEBERGER & P. LINDERT, supra note 43, at 135.
51. Id. One opponent of countertrade complains that such "governmental policies and
practices interfere with international market forces for social or other noneconomic objec-
tives." Walsh, supra note 46, at 4. This misses the point. Government intervention is entirely
legitimate under conditions of market failure. Sometimes governments must bring economic
and social benefits into line.
52. Lochner, supra note 2, at 759.
53. Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. ECON. STUD. 11, 11
(1956). For a discussion of paretian analysis, see L POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
§ 1.2 (3d ed. 1986).
54. Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 53, at 12.
1988"1
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welfare optimum, "not every step toward freer trade is desirable." 55
Thus, there is no a priori way to choose between policies aimed at a
given market failure. 6 It will be sufficient here to develop a realistic
understanding of constraints within the trade system. Government ac-
tions encouraging countertrade will then be judged as either addressing
these constraints or embodying policies that are impermissible under the
GATT.
2. Countertrade as a Second-Best Policy
The theory of the second best is well suited to the analysis of
countertrade.57 Countertrade has been termed a "necessity" 58 and an
"expedient."5 9 Recent expansion of countertrade has coincided with
worldwide economic troubles. In the face of economic and political ri-
gidities, reciprocity allows trade which would not otherwise take place.
60
"The additional trade which takes place in this second best situation can
be viewed as improving domestic economic welfare."6 When this trade-
creating effect outweighs the trade-distorting effect, countertrade in-
creases global welfare as well.62
The creation-diversion distinction comes from the customs union
literature,63 which is an important case study in the theory of the second
best." As with all second best questions, it is impossible to say a priori
55. C. KINDLEBERGER & P. LINDERT, supra note 43, at 172.
56. Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 53, at 12. Economists have developed the so-called
specificity rule to cope with this problem. "It is more efficient to use those policy tools that are
closest to the locus of the distortions separating private and social benefits or costs." C. KIN-
DLEBERGER & P. LINDERT, supra, note 43, at 172.
57. See OECD (1985), supra note 2, at 21.
58. Comment, supra note 2, at 117.
59. L. WELT, supra note 11, at 61.
60. Lowenfeld, Interface IV Countertrade in Economic Relations Between East and
West-An Introduction, 5 J. COMP. Bus. & CAPITAL MARKETS L. 329, 331 (1983). See also
Comment, The Application of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade to the Countertrade
Practices of Less Developed and Developing Countries: Proposed Amendments to the GA TT, 16
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 312, 320 (1986).
61. OECD (1985), supra note 2, at 21.
62. Cf. J. VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE 44 (1961) (originally published 1950)
(where trade-creating effect of custom union dominates trade-divrting effect, global welfare
rises); Lipsey, The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Survey, 70 ECON. J. 496, 498 (1960)
(welfare effects of customs union depend upon "relative strengths of the forces causing trade
creation and trade diversion"); Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 53, at 14 (same).
63. Two or more countries form a customs union when they abolish tariffs applicable to
trade between or among themselves while maintaining tariffs applicable to trade with countries
outside the union. See generally C. KINDLEBERGER & P. LINDERT, supra note 43, at 172-74.
64. Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 53, at 13. For a very simple graphic model of the
creation and diversion effects, see C. KINDLEBERGER & P. LINDERT, supra note 43, at 172-74.
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whether the formation of a customs union will enhance global welfare.6
Nevertheless, it is possible to make some generalizations. Given a cus-
toms union arrangement that marginally reduces tariffs, a net increase in
the volume of trade implies a rise in global welfare." Also, trade diver-
sion is minimal when the difference between the excluded seller's cost
and the inside seller's cost is small.'
The welfare effects of countertrade compare favorably with those
associated with customs unions.68 This Article demonstrates that coun-
tries impose countertrade requirements to overcome market failures and
thus permit trade where trade would not otherwise be possible. In this
way, countertrade has an effect similar to introducing trade into an
autarkic economy. Under such circumstances, trade creation must out-
weigh trade diversion. In addition, barter-like trade often occurs at mar-
ket prices;69 therefore, trade diversion is minimal."' Countertrade as a
second-best policy is economically efficient.
71
This notion conflicts with the standard view of countertrade as in-
flexible, costly, and distortionary. Barter-like trade can increase flexibil-
ity under conditions of economic distress. 2 The costs associated with
65. See C. KINDLEBERGER & P. LINDERT, supra note 43, at 175 (in customs union con-
text, increase in trade does not determine increase in welfare). See text accompanying supra
note 56.
66. Lipsey, supra note 62, at 505-06.
67. C. KINDLEBERGER & P. LINDERT, supra note 43, at 175.
68. The closest analogy is to bilateral clearing arrangements. See R. BANEPJI, supra note
17, at 96 (weighing trade expansion against trade diversion in India's bilateral clearing rela-
tionships). An OECD study tentatively concluded that India's bilateral trade in manufactured
goods was purely "additional" (Le., above and beyond multilateral trade). The study found
that some diversion in primary products trade was possible, but any such diversion was not
significant. Id. at 116-17. Because bilateral clearing arrangements allowed India to open and
then maintain direct trade with Eastern Europe, id. at 37, it seems clear that in this case, trade-
creating effects of countertrade predominated and global welfare increased.
69. Carey & McLean, supra note 1, at 452 (some LDCs require that countertrade be
transacted at market prices); Comment, supra note 2, at 138 (countertrade often transacted at
market prices through market channels). See, eg., Peru: The Targets are High, TRADE FIN.,
Feb. 1988, at 8, 8 [hereinafter Peru] (draft agreement to swap external debt for goods contains
"anti-dumping clause" requiring that goods be sold at world market prices.)
70. C. KINDLEBERGER & P. LINDERT, supra note 43, at 173-74 (trade enhancement var-
ies with, and trade diversion varies inversely to, the price difference between bilateral partners
and the world market).
71. Countertrade requirements are only likely to be inefficient when imposed solely for the
purpose of restricting trade. See infra text accompanying note 161.
72. According to the OECD, "in the context of the macro-economic constraints that
characterize economic transactions in most developing countries where distortions are often
present in prices, markets and particularly exchange rates, countertrade may be viewed as a
practical means of introducing flexibility into an otherwise rigid economic system." OECD
(1985), supra note 2, at 21.
19881
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
complexity and restricted supply must be compared "with the expense an
indebted developing country would have to incur if it tried instead to
follow traditional multilateral trading practices. '73 The very existence of
countertrade as an alternative to the multilateral payments system indi-
cates that it has value despite the apparent costliness.74 Countertrade
can benefit both parties to a transaction. 75 Barter-like trading practices
can be explained in three ways: as a reaction to prevailing economic
imperfections, including illiquidity, uncertainty, and imperfect informa-
tion; as a consequence of political rigidities; and as central to develop-
ment strategies. It is not enough to look at why individual entities barter;
the effect on third parties must also be examined. This Article now ad-
dresses in turn each of these four justifications of countertrade.
a. Economic Imperfections
i. Illiquidity
The multilateral payments system is premised upon stable, well-cali-
brated national currencies that are freely convertible to all other curren-
cies. Unfortunately, such perfect liquidity is a goal rather than a reality.
Because they bear no relation to world prices, the currencies of
nonmarket economies are totally inconvertible.76 Developing countries'
currencies are technically convertible because they are pegged to strong
currencies. Most LDC currencies, however, are pegged at an overvalued
rate for domestic reasons. 77 These features of the international economy
are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.
The meteoric rise and fall of oil prices, interacting with recession in
the industrialized countries and ambitious development programs in the
South and East, put tremendous pressure on existing monetary arrange-
ments and helped cause the debt crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. 78 Com-
pounding the crisis, net capital flows to the stricken countries have
73. Id. at 22. Even in "cash" transactions with trading entitie,; in Eastern Europe and the
Third World, negotiation costs are notoriously high.
74. Banks, supra note 6, at 164. It seems reasonable to assume that economic entities act
rationally when they elect to countertrade. But see supra text accompanying note 45. When
such entities have access to the multilateral payments system but choose instead to counter-
trade, each side must reap benefits in excess of the added costs associated with countertrade,
75. Lochner, supra note 2, at 746.
76. See, e.g., Verrill, Countertrade and Section 406: Statutory Disruption of Trade, in IN-
TERFACE Two: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS ON THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF EAST-WEST
TRADE 337, (D. Wallace & D. Flores eds. 1982).
77. See, e.g., USITC (1985), supra note 3, at 43-44.
78. See id.
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virtually dried up.79 It is universally acknowledged that the resulting
illiquidity has driven private and government entities toward barter80 In
fact, an OECD study has found that sharp rises in international barter in
all country groups have taken place during specific periods of global re-
cession and illiquidity. 1 Countertrade "may be a second-best solution in
a situation characterized by the presence of such distortions as over-
valued currencies and foreign exchange rationing." 2
In countries where foreign exchange reserves are critically low,
countertrade permits marginal transactions.83 Countertrade also facili-
tates economic exchange when credit is scarce. 4 The case of Malaysia
clearly reflects these pressures.8 5 Traditionally, the Malaysian Govern-
ment insisted on hard currency trade, even with the Eastern Bloc and
other LDCs. In 1982, however, Eastern Bloc countries' supplies of for-
eign exchange dropped, so they imported markedly less from Malaysia.
79. Carey & McLean, supra note 1, at 444. Net lending by commercial banks is near zero
and official development assistance is stagnant. Id. See also Kilborn, Baker's Dimming Luster,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1987, at Al, col. 4 (despite the 1985 "Baker Plan" to encourage lending
to developing countries, commercial banks have actually reduced their lending to these coun-
tries); Lewis, A Shift in Third World Funds, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1988, at Dl, col. 3 (develop-
ing countries now receiving less in combined aid from World Bank and International
Monetary Fund than they are paying in interest and principal on outstanding debt to those
institutions). For an innovative use of countertrade to reduce outstanding debt, see Peru, supra
note 69 (Peruvian government program to swap nontraditional exports for international com-
mercial bank debt).
80. See, eg., OECD (1985), supra note 2, at 14-16; USITC (1985), supra note 3, at 38;
Verdun, supra note 2, at 196; Carey & McLean, supra note 1, at 444; Parry, GA7T Meighs the
Evidence of Discrimination in the Growing Practice of Global Bartering, AM. BANKER, Sept. 21,
1984, at 39, col. 2 (analysis by GATT experts); Verrill, supra note 76, at 337.
81. .OUtrERS-JAEGER, supra note 1, at 14-15.
82. OECD (1985), supra note 2, at 21.
83. Inconvertibility means that trade must be financed with "hard" currency reserves,
which are scarce. Governments therefore must allocate foreign exchange. Countertrade eases
the burden on the allocation system. See, eg., USITC (1985), supra note 3, at 42 (countertrade
"allowed the stretching of funds available for trade financing"); OECD (1985), supra note 2, at
22. These transactions actually approximate open market deals more closely than cash trans-
actions where local currencies are overvalued. See BUSINESS INT'L CORP., supra note 2, at 27
(selective devaluation); OECD (1985), supra note 2, at 16, 21; USITC (1985), supra note 3, at
42. In fact, under these circumstances, countertrade may improve a nation's trade balance
position, because imported capital goods may have a higher value in terms of domestically
available resources than the international cash price. Id. at 42 n.l.
84. Countertrade is a means of finance. Eg., Lochner, supra note 2, at 728. Countertrade
transactions in general allow banks to bypass country credit evaluations, which are necessarily
very unfavorable in crisis situations. BUSINESS INT'L CORP., supra note 2, at 22.
Counterpurchasing allows risk to be borne by a trading house rather than an Eastern or South-
ern entity. Id. at 22, 27; USITC (1985), supra note 3, at 43. Buybacks allow long-term credit
which would otherwise not be given in such large deals between the East and West.
Lowenfeld, supra note 60, at 330.
85. See Schwenk, supra note 20, at 102-03.
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Simultaneously, the terms-of-trade for Malaysian exports turned unfa-
vorable, and external reserves fell so low that only ten months of imports
could be financed. In desperation, the Malaysian Government began to
encourage countertrade. 86 Thus, countertrade can enhance trade be-
cause "many countries cannot operate in a monetary system. The price
of the countertrade transaction can be viewed as the cost of borrowing
money for the transaction."87
ii. Uncertainty
Many factors have conspired in the 1970s and 1980s to create ex-
treme instability in international markets. The resulting uncertainty has
created costs for economic actors. Countertrade may provide the least
expensive hedge against instability. 8  Barter-like trade has protected
against inflation,89 dampened the effect of exchange rate swings, 90 and
stabilized LDC trade.91 Industrialized countries have also engaged in
countertrade to ensure stable supplies of strategic commodities.92
iii. Imperfect Information
Marketing primary products usually does not create problems.
However, Eastern European and less developed countries increasingly
seek to export "nbntraditional" products for which markets or lines of
distribution have yet to be established. Countertrade may be used to in-
troduce exports directly into new markets,93 or to "piggyback" on the
86. Id. Opponents of countertrade often point to Indonesia's difficulties with Its
mandatory program. "One must recognize, however, that it wasl enacted in response to a
rapidly deteriorating economic situation." Id. at 102. It is expected that Indonesia will repeal
or revise its countertrade program when its economy improves. Id.
87. Carey & McLean, supra note 1, at 450 (quoting a businessperson).
88. See OECD (1985), supra note 2, at 21.
89. Analysis of Recent Trends in U.S. Countertrade, USITC Pub. 1237, Inv. No. 332-125,
at 10 (1981) [hereinafter USITC (1981)].
90. Carey & McLean, supra note 1, at 444; Lochner, supra note 2, at 736,
91. An OECD quantitative study of five countries indicates that bilateral clearing ar-
rangements "had a stabilising effect on total trade." I. OUERS-JAEGER, supra note 1, at 84-
86. Countertrade helps to address fluctuations in export earning caused by cyclical move-
ments in commodity prices. OECD (1985), supra note 2, at 16, 18; I. OUrrERs-JAmoEu,
supra note 1, at 84 (fluctuations are a major concern in the Third World, where economies
depend on restricted range of exports); Lochner, supra note 2, at "736. Reciprocity can ensure
stability of imports as well. L. WELT, supra note 11, at 65-66.
92. See supra note 34.
93. Bilateral barter-like trade has been "instrumental" in promoting exports of minor
traditional and new industrial goods. I. OUTERS-JAEOER, supra note 1, at 60. See OECD
(1985), supra note 2, at 18. In the 1960s, India's State Trading Corporation used barter to
introduce gunny sacks to Switzerland, typewriters to France, and carpets to Sweden. R.
BANERJI, supra note 17, at 36.
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marketing capabilities of multinational corporations.- For instance, Yu-
goslavia once bought seven airplanes from McDonnell Douglas Corpora-
tion. In return, McDonnell Douglas accepted some cash, and agreed to
act as broker for nine million dollars in Yugoslav goods new to the
American market (and purchased forty thousand dollars in hams for its
cafeterias).95 As a marketing tool, countertrade helps to disseminate
commercial information which otherwise would be unavailable.
b. Political Rigidities
Political rigidities also impose constraints on the free trade ideal.
Ideology, economic planning, and the bureaucratic matrix of foreign
trade in Eastern and Southern countries provide a strong impetus to re-
ciprocal trading. 6 Because this matrix is ideologically based, it is un-
likely to change and must be accepted as an exogenous factor.97
Countertrade also facilitates trade that would otherwise be impossible
because of political antipathy;9" it can even ease political tensions.99
94. USITC (1981), supra note 89, at 5 (Eastern European countries); Yoffie, Profiling
from Countertrade, HARv. Bus. REv., May-June 1984, at 8, 9. Critics of countertrade raise
two problems with this marketing rationale. First, in commodity markets, countertraded
goods may simply displace existing sales. See, e.g., OECD (1985), supra note 2, at 24. How-
ever, this kind of trade diversion is not yet significant in volume. Id. at 26. Second, shunting
off marketing upon multinational corporations may preclude development of independent dis-
tribution channels. See, eg., id. at 24; Banks, supra note 6, at 166-68. To be fair, though,
"cash" transactions have so far not created independent channels either. Countertrade actu-
ally may encourage nonmarket economies to react to marketing information. USITC (1985),
supra note 3, at 2 (evidence accounts cause MNCs to assist foreign party in redesigning or
developing marketable products).
95. Weigand, International Trade Without Money, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1977, at
28, 28-29.
96. See generally Banks, supra note 6, at 172-74. See also de Miramon, supra note 2, at
14-15. First, Eastern Bloc countries are very reluctant to enmesh themselves in world capital-
ism. Second, countertrade harmonizes foreign trade with central planning. As a balancing
device, countertrade offers planners both stability and predictability. Third, the ultimate goal
of plan fulfillment guarantees that foreign trade plays a peripheral role in Eastern economic
organization. Essentially, foreign trade organizations use countertrade to dispose of surplus
items and to acquire necessary imports. Perestroika, the package of Soviet economic reforms,
aims to streamline the foreign trade bureaucracy but does not strike at the underpinnings of
countertrade. See generally Barrett, How the West Could Win for Gorbachev, EUROMOnEY,
Sept. 1987, at 473. In fact, liberalization of the strict entity-by-entity quota system may en-
courage countertrade by increasing the range of products an Eastern trader can offer as
counterpurchases. Comecon Through 1989, Bus. INTL', Dec. 7, 1987, at 388-89. These same
factors, to a lesser extent, encourage countertrade in developing countries with large public
sectors.
97. Countertrade has been criticized because it delays economic reforms, particularly in
non-market economies. Se4 e.g., de Miramon, supra note 46, at 351. It is not clear, however,
that nonbarter trade is more consistent with reform. Cf slipra note 95.
98. Sometimes, routine sales are politically impossible, as was the case between Pakistan
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Countertrade serves as a proxy for "in'vestment" where views of capital-
ism and sovereignty discourage equity participation by multinational cor-
porations."° Finally, barter-like trade can counteract anticompetitive
government practices. 101
c. Countertrade and Development
Much of the foregoing analysis makes countertrade an attractive de-
velopment tool for Eastern European countries 10 2 and LDCs.103 Because
a multinational corporation has an ongoing interest in the output of an
industrial compensation project, the recipient countries are assured of
appropriate and dynamic technologies. 0 Bilateral clearing arrange-
ments have allowed developing countries to diversify away from ex-colo-
nial powers, open new sources of development assistance,10 5 and foster
regional integration. 06 Less developed countries may even improve their
terms of trade via barter,10 7 casting doubt on the thesis that ordinary
cash transactions are more efficient than countertrade.
By definition, developing countries (whether in the Third World or
and Bangladesh-the former East Pakistan. Although the two economies had substantial com-
plementarity, political antipathy ruled out use of hard currency or credit. The two countries
ended up simultaneously bartering equal values of jute and cotton. Weigand, supra note 95, at
29.
99. Comment, supra note 2, at 149-50.
100. See Guyot, supra note 8, at 921. See also Lochner, supra note 2, at 746; de Miramon,
supra note 46, at 348. Countertrade "acts as an interface, and facilitates a greater degree of
economic interchange." Lochner, supra note 2, at 746.
101. Barter allowed traders to contract around the OPEC cartel price for oil, attaining a
price nearer the hypothetical competitive equilibrium. See, e.g., L. WELT, supra note 11, at 65-
66. Countertrade also may allow Eastern and Southern traders to get around Western non-
tariff barriers. de Miramon, supra note 46, at 348; Comment, supra note 46, at 348; Com-
ment, supra note 2, at 133, 149. Contra OECD (1985), supra note 2, at 17.
102. Verrill, supra note 76, at 337.
103. Carey & McLean, supra note 1, at 454-55.
104. USITC (1981), supra note 90, at 5 (Eastern European countries); BUSINESS INT'L
CORP., supra note 2, at 30 (LDCs).
105. I. OuTrERS-JAEGER, supra note 1, at 60-61, 120-21. For instance, Yugoslavia used
barter to help Pakistan install wells; Yugoslavia contributed equipment, construction assist-
ance, and technology, and received partial payment in raw jute. Id. at 49-50.
106. For example, the Latin American Integration Association faicilitates bilateral arrange-
ments to encourage regional development. Carey & McLean, supra note 1, at 432.
107. If barter trade directly between East and South reduces transaction costs by eliminat-
ing Western middlemen, both East and South would be better off. Likewise, more favorable
terms-of-trade would result if countertrade, in comparison with multilateral trade, allows East
and South to realize greater complementarity of consumption and production. An OECD
study found that developing countries' terms-of-trade with the nonmarket economies were
generally not worse, and in some cases better, than terms in the multilateral system. I, OUT-
TERS- JAEGER, supra note 1, at 109.
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Eastern Europe) are not well integrated into the world economy. Market
failures and political rigidities are more common and more pressing in
the economic affairs of these countries. 108 Hence, countertrade addresses
a wide range of deeply felt needs in the developing world. 9
d. Effect on Third Parties and World Trade
Traders achieve real benefits through countertrade since they are
able to overcome barriers to trade. Between the immediate trading par-
ties, countertrade can provide a second-best solution to market failures
and political distortions. However, the countertrading parties do not
capture all the benefits of their actions; the benefits of increased trade
spill over to third parties. New resources are tapped, new markets are
opened, and beleaguered economies are saved from collapse. Counter-
trade may indeed be a second-best solution from the standpoint of the
world economy.
It is true that countertrade has costs as well as benefits. When com-
pared with the realities of "cash" trade, however, countertrade does not
seem so expensive.110 Furthermore, any residual costs of countertrade
do not spill over in the same manner as the benefits. Since traders can
choose to utilize the multilateral payments system, the transaction costs
associated with countertrade cannot be passed along to third parties.1 '
"The costs to the world economy of countertrade... are thus relatively
small and are borne principally by the countries imposing them."
' 12
Where countertrade is costly and therefore trade-distorting, it is also
likely to be self-correcting.
In addition, the existence of countertrade need not threaten the mul-
tilateral payments system; countertrade may be viewed as supplemen-
tary. 1' World trade is not perfectly continuous, but countertrade helps
108. One commentator has observed:
[A]lIthough there may be short-term policy considerations which lead a government
to adopt countertrade requirements, such practices are economically inefficient and,
in the long-run, ultimately restrict rather than expand trade.
Verdun, supra note 2, at 201 (footnote omitted). Even if this is true, "[poor countries that
have no foreign exchange cannot take a long-run view of international trade." Weigand, supra
note 95, at 42.
109. Of course, countertrade can also aid traders in developed countries in overcoming
market imperfections. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 26 ("reverse" countertrade).
110. See supra note 73.
Ill. OECD (1985), supra note 2, at 25. In addition, countertrade is often transacted at
market prices through market channels. Comment, supra note 2, at 138. See supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
112. Banks, supra note 6, at 178.
113. Carey & McLean, supra note 1, at 452 (view of Latin American governments).
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to provide the interface between segments of the global economy that are
separated by market failure, ideology, or political antipathy. Far from
threatening to displace the GATT as a parallel bilateral system, barter-
like trade remains "largely ad hoc in nature." '
IV. COUNTERTRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is both a detailed set
of legal rules" 5 and an international organization charged with oversee-
ing the operation of those rules. 1 16 This section offers a defense of
countertrade, under GATT's rules, when used as a second-best policy.
Part V then explores the institutional ramifications of countertrade for
the GAIT. The ultimate goal of the General Agreement is to enhance
global economic welfare."I7 To this end, the GATT was designed to in-
crease world trade and allocate resources efficiently."l 8
Countertrade has been criticized repeatedly as incompatible with the
goals of the GATT"19 and as contravening specific GAIT provisions.
120
114. Schwenk, supra note 20, at 96. See Lochner, supra note 2, at 729.
115. The GATT is in reality a series of more than one hundred agreements. J. JACKSON &
W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 296 (2d ed.
1986).
116. Id. at 293-96.
117. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT § 2.6 (1969); Czinkota &
Talbot, GAIT Regulation of Countertrade: Issues and Prospects, 1 INT'L TRADE J. 155, 156
(1986).
118. J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 1.1; Czinkota & Talbot, supra note 117, at 156. The
GAIT seeks economic efficiency through four central principles: open markets, see GATT,
supra note 5, arts. II (tariff concessions) & XI (elimination of quantitative restrictions); non-
discrimination, see id. arts. I (most favored nation treatment) & III (national treatment); recl-
procity, see id. art. I; and transparency, see id. art. X (publication and administration of trade
regulations).
119. See, eg., Czinkota & Talbot, supra note 117, at 157-59; Gildbaw, The Implications of
Countertrade under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 5 J. COMP. BUs. & CAPITAL
MARKETS L. 355, 355 (1983) ("fundamental incompatibility between countertrade practices
and the framework of trade envisioned by the GATT drafters"). Note, however, that a "con-
tradiction of the spirit of the accord is insufficient cause for the GATT to take any kind of
action." Czinkota & Talbot, supra note 117, at 159.
120. See Czinkota & Talbot, supra note 117 (highlighting GATT articles most likely to be
violated by countertrade); Roessler, Countertrade and the GA 7T Legal System, 19 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 20 (1985) (same); Verdun, supra note 2, at 211-13 (arguing that countertrade re-
quirements constitute quantitative restrictions under article XI); Liebman, Comment: GAM7
and Countertrade Requirements, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 252 (1984) (reviewing arguments
that countertrade requirements of Eastern countries violate various provisions of GATI);
Baker & Cunningham, Countertrade and the Law, 5 J. COMP. Bus. & CAPITAL MARKETS L.
375 (1983) (same); Gadbaw, supra note 119 (arguing that countertrade violates several GATT
provisions); Comment, supra note 60 (analyzing countertrade under several GATT articles,
with special attention to developing countries).
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It is clear that application of GATT rules requires careful consideration
of GATT goals.'21 Because GATT legal problems cannot be analyzed
without reference to economic facts and goals," however, these views
are severely compromised by adherence to the general equilibrium cri-
tique of countertrade.
Under conditions of market failure, the parallel GATT objectives of
increased trade and allocative efficiency may conflict. As a second-best
solution, countertrade's trade-enhancing effects far outweigh its trade-
distorting effects. Therefore, countertrade may be consistent with the ul-
timate GATT goal of global economic welfare.
Furthermore, the GATT itself may be read as a second-best system
of rules in two important respects. First, the GAT represents a second-
best political solution. The General Agreement was never meant to be
comprehensive; rather, it was to function as a component of the Interna-
tional Trade Organization." When the United States Congress effec-
tively killed the International Trade Organization in 1950 by refusing to
ratify its charter, the GATT remained, though "ill-adapted to perform
the role that had been thrust upon it.""24 Hence, from its inception, the
General Agreement has failed to address problems of nonmarket econo-
mies, less developed countries, employment, foreign investment, and eco-
nomic development in a satisfying manner.1" This remains a problem
today:
One of the challenges of the near future, is how the elaborate
GATT system, which was designed primarily for market economies of
mostly advanced industries, can accomodate the special problems of
either nonmarket economies, or developing countries.1
26
In fact, the GATT has never officially come into force; it has always
rested on nothing more sound than a Protocol of Provisional Applica-
tion. 127 Second, the GATT recognizes that "first-best" economic out-
121. J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 2.6; Comment, supra note 60, at 317.
122. J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 1.1.
123. See K. KOCK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY AND THE GATr 1947-1967, at 69-70
(1969).
124. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 295-96.
125. See, eg., J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 20.1; K. KOCK, supra note 123, at 66-67.
126. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 6. Accord G. WINHAbi, INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATIONs 375 (1966). See id. at 376 (Tokyo
Round not successful at bridging North-South gap; developing countries frozen out of negoti-
ations, development needs not addressed); K. KOCK, supra note 123, at 264 (dissatisfaction of
Southern and Eastern countries with GATT led to creation of United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD)).
127. Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6, T.LA.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
1988]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
comes are not always attainable. For example, the General Agreement
endorses trade restrictions to safeguard the national balance of pay-
ments, 128 to protect domestic industries in emergencies, 129 and to protect
national security.'30
Countertrade may complement and supplement the existing legal
framework of international trade. The second-best nature of counter-
trade has implications regarding the applicability of current GATT rules.
A. Applying GATT Rules to Countertrade
There is no reference whatsoever to countertrade in the General
Agreement, and no contracting party has ever raised the issue before a
GATT dispute-resolution panel.131 Further, it seems settled that
countertrade does not constitute a per se violation of the GATT.'32
Under certain circumstances, however, it is possible that a particular
countertrade transaction may be inconsistent with a GATT obligation.
Some commentators have suggested that GATT provisions should be in-
terpreted broadly to proscribe countertrade transactions.13 3 This is mis-
leading because of the delicate consensual basis of the GATT.'34 The
restrictive provisions of the General Agreement are strictly construed.,35
It must also be borne in mind that the GATT does not reach all
countertrade transactions. First, the GATT does not cover military
trade, so it cannot limit most offset trading. 136 Second, only contracting
parties incur GATT obligations. 137 Third, the GATT governs govern-
ment action and not private decisions; GATT provisions are only rele-
128. GATT, supra note 5, art. XII.
129. Id. art. XIX.
130. Id. art. XXI.
131. OECD (1985), supra note 2, at 11.
132. USITC (1985), supra note 3, at 120 app. H (general view). See also BusiNESS INT'L
CORP., supra note 2, at 34-35 (position of GATT secretariat); Parry, supra note 80, at 40
(same).
133. See Verdun, supra note 2, at 207 (interpretation of Article XI on quantitative restric-
tions); Parry, supra note 80, at 40.
134. See G. WINHAM, supra note 126, at 20.
135. Liebman, supra note 120, at 260. See Czinkote & Talbot, supra note 117, at 159. For
a general discussion of GATT interpretation, see J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 1.5.
136. See, eg., USITC (1985), supra note 3, at 120 app. H. It must be noted that military
hardware accounts for a relatively large portion of barter trade. Watson, supra note 2, at 37,
39.
137. For a list of the ninety contracting parties and thirty-one countries applying the
GAT on a de facto basis, see J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 312 (as of Feb.
1985). Only six nonmarket economies are GATT members: Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
,Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Substantially fewer countries have signed the Multilateral
Trade Negotiating codes. See id. at 330.
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vant when violated by an official "requirement or inducement to engage
in countertrade." 3la Most writers therefore focus on "mandated"
countertrade.
139
This Article will proceed by analyzing countertrade as a second-best
policy under each relevant provison of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. The GATT goal of open trade finds expression as a broad
prohibition against quantitative restriction. First, this Article will take
up the contention most strenuously urged by commentators-that
countertrade constitutes a quantitative restriction. Addressed second
will be the less categorical twin nondiscrimination principles: most fa-
vored nation treatment and national treatment. Third, this Article will
explore the subsidies obligations of the General Agreement, and fourth,
the Article will review miscellaneous provisions of the GATT. Finally,
the Article will examine countertrade's role in the application of GATT
rules to nonmarket economies and less developed countries.
1. Quantitative Restrictions
To render tariff reductions meaningful, the GATT comprehensively
regulates the use of quantitative restrictions. 140 Article XI states the gen-
eral rule prohibiting quantitative restrictions:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of
any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of
any product destined for the teritory of any other contracting party.'
41
The apparent breadth of this proscription has prompted commentators
to declare that countertrade is inconsistent with the GATT.142 "If im-
port licenses are granted on the condition that the imports are linked to
exports," the argument runs, "trading opportunities are restricted
138. Parry, supra note 80, at 40. Accord Czinkota & Talbot, supra note 117, at 157.
139. See eg., Walsh, supra note 27. The term "mandated countertrade" is extremely con-
fusing. Often, it refers to countries that require bilateralism in substantially all trade transac-
tions. Only two countries, Indonesia and Romania, mandate countertrade in this way. See,
e.g., Lochner, supra note 2, at 739.
140. GATT, supra note 5, art. XI(1). Articles XI(2), XII, XIV, and XVIII part B provide
for exceptions to this rule. Article XIII regulates existing and permitted quantitative
restrictions.
141. GATT, supra note 5, art. XI(l). Article XI reaches restrictions "made effective
through state-trading operations." Id. annex I (arts. XI, XII, XIII, XIV, and XVIII).
142. See ,,g., Verdun, supra note 2, at 192.
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through a method other than duties, taxes or charges."' 43 However, this
argument is not supported by a close reading of the language of article
XI, the intended scope of its prohibition, or the spirit of the General
Agreement.
The characterization of countertrade as a quantitative restriction
rests on the proposition that any government action which operates to
restrict trade in any way violates article XI.144 Such a reading would
obviate other articles of the GATT, such as the subsidies provisions of
article XVI.145 Article XI proscribes quantitative restrictions, and
countertrade does not restrict imports by quantity. 1
46
The primary target of article XI has always been quotas. 4
7
Countertrade does not involve explicit quotas. 148 Therefore, the applica-
bility of the GATT prohibition of quantitative restrictions depends upon
whether countertrade operates like a quota. 149
143. Roessler, supra note 120, at 605. Accord Verdun, supra note 2, at 211-12 ("counter-
trade requirements impose quid pro quo conditions that restrict trade"); Comment, supra note
60, at 326.
144. Gadbaw, supra note 119, at 361; see also Liebman, supra note 120, at 254 (counter-
trade violates GATT because it limits imports).
145. GATT, supra note 5, art. XVI(l) (regulating use of subsidies to reduce imports).
146. Contra Liebman, supra note 120, at 254; Gadbaw, supra note 119, at 361; Comment,
supra note 60, at 327. Countertrade is contingent upon the value of goods and services taken
out of a country. If a trader wishes to raise its exports to a country that mandates counter-
trade, it must accept more exports from that country. Industrial compensation arrangements
have nothing to do with the quantitative restriction of imported goods. In the typical buyback
transaction, a multinational corporation sets up a manufacturing facility in the host country
and then takes a defined quantity of the manufactured product in payment. See supra text
accompanying notes 29-34. Commercial compensation policies may limit a country's imports
of a product to a fixed percentage of the value of specific exported products; this is the
counterpurchase ratio. See supra text accompanying note 22. However, the country's counter-
trade partner decides how much of the specified products to purchase. Therefore, the partner
determines the level of imports into the country.
If a government adopts a countertrade policy for the purpose of setting a quantitative
restriction on imports, that policy would certainly come within the article XI prohibition. It
has been shown, though, that many other reasons motivate countertrade policies. See supra
Part III.
The General Agreement has always recognized that quantitative restrictions are distin-
guishable from other types of restrictions. For example, during the drafting of article XI, the
United States took the following position: "Of all the forms of restrictionism ever devised by
the mind of man, Quantitative Restriction is the worst." J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 13.2
(footnote omitted) (quoting U.N. Doc. EPCT/A/P.V.22 (1947)).
147. See Verdun, supra note 2, at 205. At the drafting conferences involving quantitative
restrictions, the participants debated the evils of quotas. See J. JACKSON, supra note 117,
§ 13.2. Professor Jackson defines quantitative restrictions as quota, id. § 13.1, then proceeds
to equate the two ideas throughout his discussion, id. ch. 13.
148. See Verdun, supra note 2, at 206.
149. Where the degree of consensus on a provision of the GATT is low, the provision will
be read narrowly. See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text. The preparatory work for
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A quota is a government decree that during a given period, only a
specific amount of a product may be imported.1 50 Tariffs and quotas af-
fect international trade in very different ways:
In the case of a tariff the total volume of imports can expand with
the expansion of trade. There is flexibility in the volume of trade.
Under a quota system the volume of trade is rigidly restricted, and no
matter how much more people may wish to buy or consume, not one
single more unit will be admitted than the controlling authority thinks
the quantitative restrictions articles reflected "major policy clashes." J. JACKSON, supra note
117, § 13.2. Article XI was adopted only after a "struggle," and the less-developed countries
were very displeased with the results. Id. The LDCs as a group have opposed these provi-
sions. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 367. Further, developed countries have
negotiated devices such as voluntary export restraints and orderly marketing arrangements
that resemble quotas much more closely than does countertrade. See generally id. at 608-22.
Still, as Professor Verdun has argued, Article XI may apply to quantitative restrictions
that are not quotas. Verdun, supra note 2, at 211. She cites three recent article XI disputes in
support of this proposition. Id. at 208-11. See EEC--Quantitative Restrictions Against Im-
ports of Certain Products from Hong Kong, BISD, supra note 5, 30th Supp., at 129 (1984);
Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, BISD, supra note 5, 30th
Supp., at 140 [hereinafter Canadian FIRA]; United States--Imports of Certain Automotive
Spring Assemblies, BISD, supra note 5, 30th Supp., at 107.
In Products from Hong Kong, the United Kingdom (on behalf of Hong Kong) sought
relief from French quantitative restrictions on eight product categories. France maintained
import quotas for five of these categories; the remaining three were subject to a de facto quota
administered under special regulations. BISD, supra note 5, 30th Supp. at 129-31. The GATT
panel found that France infringed its article XI obligations for all eight categories of products.
Id. at 140. Thus, article XI proscribes certain quantitative import restrictions that closely
resemble quotas.
In Canadian FIRA, the United States challenged application of a Canadian law designed
to ensure that investment projects would provide "significant benefit to Canada." Canadian
FIRA, supra, at 142. Under FIRA, foreign investors routinely negotiated undertakings with
the Canadian government. Id. at 143. Some of these undertakings committed the investors
"to purchase goods of Canadian origin in preference to imported goods or in specified amounts
or proportions." Id. at 146. "[IThe Panel, noting that purchase undertakings do not prevent
the importation of goods as such, reached the conclusion that they are not inconsistent with
Article XI:l." Id. at 163.
Spring Assemblies involved a U.S. International Trade Commission exclusion order di-
rected against imported products that violated a United States patent. BISD, supra note 5.
30th Supp., at 107. Canada complained that the order violated article XI. Id. at 119-20. The
GATT panel found that the exclusion order came within an article XX exception; therefore, it
did not reach a conclusion with respect to Article XI. Id. at 126-27.
These three panel reports stand for the proposition that article XI may apply to quantita-
tive restrictions other than quotas, but only if the restrictions closely resemble quotas. Profes-
sor Verdun reads the cases much more broadly, apparently because she finds it "noteworthy"
that parties in Canadian FIRA and Spring Assembles have challenged "practice[s] which did
not involve quotas." Verdun, supra note 2, at 210. The panel reports, however, simply do not
support her conclusion that "countertrade requirements clearly constitute violations of the
GATT." Id. at 213. See also supra note 132 and accompanying text (countertrade is not a per
se violation of GATT rules).
150. J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 13.1.
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fit.
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Quotas "completely break any link between domestic and world
prices." '152 Countertrade does not operate like a quota: 153 it allows the
volume of imports to expand with the expansion of trade, it introduces
flexibility, 54 and it does not break the link between world and domestic
prices. 55 Article XI was never intended to regulate measures like
countertrade requirements.
In order to interpret the article XI prohibition of quantitative re-
strictions, it is necessary to look to the spirit of the GATT.t56 The
GATT frowns on quotas in part because they embody political interven-
tion and interrupt the flow of goods in response to cash price.157 It is
clear that quantitative restrictions were prohibited by GATT because
they were considered to be incompatible with the expansion of world
trade.158 Commentators who believe that countertrade contravenes the
quantitative restrictions articles therefore state that, like quotas, counter-
trade restricts trade.1 59 They fail to appreciate the trade-enhancing qual-
ities of countertrade. Government intervention to overcome economic
and political rigidities can increase world trade."6 When it overcomes
market failures, countertrade departs from ordinary cash transactions in
a manner consistent with the spirit of the GATT. Unless intended spe-
cifically to protect domestic products, countertrade does not constitute a
quantitative restriction.
Moreover, even if a particular instance of countertrade constitutes a
quantitative restriction within the meaning of article XI, it may still fall
within the GATT exceptions for measures that address balance-of-pay-
ments difficulties.16" ' Countertrade is largely consistent with the spirit of
151. Id. § 13.2 (quoting U.N. Doc. EPCT/A/P.V.22 (1947)) (U.S. position).
152. Bell, Analysis of Alternative Protective Measures, in UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, PAPERS I (1971), excerpted in J. JACK-
SON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 421.
153. But see Liebman, supra note 120, at 254 (countertrade is a de facto quota).
154. See supra text accompanying note 72.
155. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
156. Comment, supra note 60, at 326 n.92. See also Verdun, supra note 2, at 192, 207
(article XI must be interpreted in light of economic circumstances and reality of international
practices).
157. Verdun, supra note 2, at 213; see also J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 13.2.
158. Comment, supra note 60, at 327.
159. See, eg., Verdun, supra note 2, at 212-13.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
161. See Liebman, supra note 120, at 259; Comment, supra note 60, at 327-34. But see
Verdun, supra note 2, at 206 n.85. Article XII provides that "any contracting party, in order
to safeguard its external financial position and its balance of payments, may restrict the quan-
tity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported." GATT, supra note 5, art. XII(I). See
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the GATT balance-of-payments safeguards. Acute balance-of-payments
problems are a primary factor motivating countertrade. 162 Furthermore,
article XII recognizes that "widespread application" of quantitative re-
strictions may indicate "the existence of a general disequilibrium which
is restricting international trade." '163 Thus, "when countertrade is used
as a way of producing a reasonable trade balance with the West, which




The General Agreement strives not only to decrease barriers ob-
structing international flows, but also to ensure that trade is conducted
on a nondiscriminatory basis. The most favored nation (MFN) principle
bars discrimination among the products of different contracting parties;
the national treatment principle prohibits discrimination between foreign
and domestic products. Special problems also arise with respect to state-
trading enterprises. Because countertrade has been assailed as "inher-
ently discriminatory,"1 65 these GATT norms must be explored.
a. The Most Favored Nation Principle
Central to the General Agreement is the unconditional most favored
nation principle contained in article :166
generally J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 26.3. Such restrictions, however, may only be em-
ployed to the extent necessary to address critically low monetary reserves. GATT, supra note
5, art. XII(2). See also id. art. XII(3)(a) (contracting parties must choose restrictions that
restore balance-of-payments equilibrium, minimize economic distortion, and "expand rather
than contract international trade"); id. art. XH(4) (party applying restrictions must consult
with other contracting parties). Article XVIII, section B, offers a similar but more forgiving
safeguard to developing countries. See J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 26.4.
162. See GAIT, supra note 5, art. XII(1); id. art. XVIII(9); supra text accompanying
notes 78-80; supra text accompanying notes 85-86 (Malaysia resorted to countertrade when
foreign exchange reserves plummetted). See also GAIT, supra note 5, art. XHI(3)(a) (parties
should adopt measures which expand world trade); supra note 60 and accompanying text
(countertrade allows trade which would otherwise be impossible). Cf. J. JACKSON, supra note
117, § 26.3 (summarizing rules for using balance-of-payments restrictions).
163. GAIT supra note 5, art. XII(5) (contracting parties must discuss "[measures] to re-
move the underlying causes of the disequilibrium"). Since 1955, the contracting parties have
"recognized that for [LDCs] balance-of-payments difficulties will tend to be generated by de-
velopment itself." Reports Relating to the Review of the Agreement: Quantitative Restrictions,
BISD, supra note 5, 3d Supp., at 183 (1955).
164. Baker & Cunningham, supra note 120, at 378. But see Declaration on Trade Measures
Taken for Balance-of-Payments Purposes, BISD, supra note 5, 26th Supp., at 205 (1980) (at-
tempting to narrow scope of balance-of-payments safeguards).
165. Kg., Comment, supra note 60, at 314-16.
166. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 428. Many other MFN clauses are
19881
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
With respect to ... all rules and formalities in connection with
importation and exportation... any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating
in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties. 167
In essence, the MFN principle requires contracting parties to globalize
all bilateral trade preferences.
Article I draws upon a long history of most favored nation
clauses.i 6' Nevertheless, the unconditional MEN obligation is exceed-
ingly difficult to interpret. 169 One thing does seem clear: countertrade,
when applied equally to all contracting parties, does not violate article
1.170 Most explicit countertrade programs are facially nondiscrimina-
tory. Still, it is conceivable that discriminatory operation of countertrade
requirements could be considered a violation of the MFN principle.
171
There is little indication, however, of any such de facto discrimination.
1 72
Countertrade policies tend to make distinctions among goods and not
countries. Distinctions among goods are permissible under article 1.173
Bilateral clearing arrangements require separate analysis. Because a
country might have such arrangements with some trading partners but
scattered throughout the GATT. J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 11.3 (listing MFN
provisions).
167. GATT, supra note 5, art. I(I).
168. J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 11.1.
169. Id. § 11.3.
170. Gadbaw, supra note 119, at 359 ("A strict reading of the language of Article I sup-
ports the view that a countertrade requirement applying equally to all foreign countries would
not be inconsistent with [the MFN principle] because all foreign countries are subject to the
same requirement."). Accord Liebman, supra note 120, at 253. See Comment, supra note 60,
at 319. It is possible to go further. Unless a new trade policy confers "any advantage, favor,
privilege or immunity," it can be argued, the policy cannot contravene article I. Countertrade
programs impose burdens, not benefits. Professor Roessler, a Counsellor in the Legal Office of
the GATT secretariat, seems to have adopted this reasoning; he states only that "[a] tariff
advantage conditional upon the fulfilment [sic] of countertrade requirements that is not made
available to all contracting parties is contrary to [article I]." Roessler, supra note 120, at 605,
171. See Liebman, supra note 120, at 253.
172. But see Comment, supra note 60, at 319 ("The typical countertrade transaction may
violate the most favored nation principle."). The commentator offers only a hypothetical-an
unconvincing one at that-to support his assertion. He assumes that developing country X
imports grain and exports tin. X imposes countertrade on country Y, forcing it to market X's
tin. However, country A has no marketing expertise, so X simply buys grain from A. This
model is unrealistic. First, Y is likely to be a corporation, not a country subject to GATT
obligations, and X will probably not care where the corporation is located. Second, Y will
almost certainly not "buy" grain from underdeveloped A; Y will insist on some kind of barter
arrangement if one is not already in place.
173. See J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 11.3.
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not with others, it might be tempting to assert that this type of counter-
trade violates the MFN principle. Article I, however, was never meant
to reach bilateral clearing arrangements. In light of the strong GATr
preference for multilateral cash payments, it would be perverse to require
that the "benefit" of such arrangements be accorded to all contracting
parties. Bilateral clearing facilitates East-South and South-South trade
in the face of illiquidity. Clearing arrangements do not discriminate
against Western traders; rather, they enable LDCs and nonmarket coun-
tries to approximate trade with the West. Like other forms of counter-
trade, bilateral clearing does not violate the GATT most favored nation
obligation.
b. The National Treatment Principle
GATT article Ill contains the basic statement of the national treat-
ment principle:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting country shall be accorded
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements af-
fecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use.
174
Article III covers any internal tax or regulation affecting internal sales,
whether applied within the contracting party or at its borders. 175
Through the norm of national treatment, the GATT seeks to foreclose
protection of domestic industries by contracting parties.1
76
Although there is little to indicate that countertrade has been used
as a protectionist device, commentators suggest that countertrade re-
quirements that tie the level of imports to the level of exports violate
article 111.177 "Obviously," writes one, "a producer whose goods cannot
be imported unless they are linked with an export is worse off than a
domestic producer who does not have to satisfy such a requirement." 178
174. GATT, supra note 5, art. 111(4).
175. Id. annex I (article III).
176. See id. art. III(1) (internal taxation and regulation "should not be applied to imported
or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production"); J. JACKSON & W.
DAVEY, supra note 115, at 484-85. Article III also fosters liberalized trade by decreasing
distortionary government interference in trade flows. Id. at 483.
177. Gadbaw, supra note 119, at 360. Accord Czinkota & Talbot, supra note 117, at 160.
Such a tie is only present in commercial compensation; it is difficult to imagine how industrial
compensation would raise any national treatment issue. Industrial compensation agreements
provide for large-scale facilities that are unavailable in the domestic (host) market.
178. Czinkota & Talbot, supra note 117, at 160.
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The applicability of article III is not so obvious, however, because na-
tional treatment proscribes only internal regulation. 179 "It was ... the
intention of the drafters ... clearly to treat the imported products in the
same way as the like domestic products once they had been cleared
through customs."' s0
Countertrade is not an internal regulation."'1 Countertraded goods
come into a country in the same manner as any other goods. Once im-
ported, they are subject to exactly the same conditions as, and compete
freely with, "like" domestic products. Southern and Eastern govern-
ments often use countertrade to obtain Western goods and services for
which there is no like product of national origin."8 2 Moreover, by over-
coming economic and political rigidities, barter-like trade makes impor-
tation possible in the first place.18 3 In a second-best world, countertrade
policies allow foreign products to compete with domestic products with-
out imposing internal regulation. Therefore, countertrade is consistent
with the article III national treatment principle.
The possibility of discrimination against imports in government pro-
curement policies presents a separate issue. Many developing countries
use offset financing to cushion the shock of large government purchases.
These transactions, however, are almost entirely military and thus are
not within the purview of the GATT.' In addition, article III specifi-
cally exempts government procurement from the national treatment obli-
179. See GATr, supra note 5, art. III. See generally J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 12.4.
180. Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, BISD, supra note 5,
7th Supp., at 64 (1959) (report by Panel for Conciliation) (Italian law providing concessionary
credit to certain farmers for purchase of Italian-made farm machinery found inconsistent with
obligations under Article III) (emphasis added). Accord Canadian FIRA, supra note 149, at
160, 162.
181. Many of the GATT complaints under Article III have involved internal taxes, See J,
JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 495-96 (listing cases). One practitioner draws an
analogy between domestic content regulation and countertrade. See Gadbaw, supra note 119,
at 360. He refers to a GATT panel report which held that the European Economic Commu-
nity's domestic content measures violated article III. See EEC--Measures on Animal Feed
Proteins, BISD, supra note 5, 25th Supp., at 65 (1979). The EEC required domestic importers
of feeds to purchase specific quantities of skim milk powder for use in the feeds. In reaching its
conclusion the panel found that the measures were internal regulations designed to protect
domestic production. Id. Countertrade policies do not require that imported goods be altered
in any way, and there is little evidence to indicate that barter-like trade is designed to protect
domestic industries. Thus, this case does not say much about the applicability of article III to
countertrade.
182. See, e.g., supra note 105.
183. See supra text accompanying note 60.
184. See GATT, supra note 5, art. XXI(b)(ii) (GATI does not cover traffic in weapons or
other military material). See also text accompanying note 136.
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gation.18 5 The new Government Procurement Code does commit all
signatories to MFN and national treatment in procurement, 186 but it
contains a much weaker statement opposing offset procurement 18 7 Be-
sides, only one LDC (and no nonmarket country) has accepted the
Code."' For those reasons, the General Agreement has very little bear-
ing on countertrade in government procurement.
c. State Trading
Some developed countries, most developing countries, and all
nonmarket countries use state trading enterprises extensively in their for-
eign economic affairs.1" 9 The General Agreement has always displayed a
distinct free market orientation; basic GATr rules are quite unsatisfac-
tory when applied to state trading enterprises. 90 Still, the drafters recog-
nized that these enterprises, through ordinary buy or sell transactions,
can engage in discrimination. 91 Article XVII embodies the drafters' at-
tempt at extending free market norms of nondiscrimination to the con-
text of state trading.192 Under article XVII, each enterprise must, "in its
purchases or sales involving either imports or exports, act in a manner
consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment
prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting im-
185. GATT, supra note 5, art. III(8)(a). "[lIt is generally considered that the MFN obliga-
tion also does not apply to government purchases." J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115,
at 522 (footnote omitted).
186. Agreement on Government Procurement, BISD, supra note 5, 26th Supp., at 33, art.
H(1) (1980) [hereinafter Procurement Code].
187. Id. art. V(14)(h) (procurement entities "should normally refrain" from offset con-
tracts, and when they use offset, they must limit it to "a reasonable proportion within the
contract value and shall not favour suppliers from one Party over suppliers from any other
Party"). See Roessler, supra note 120, at 608-09.
188. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 330 (as of Feb. 24, 1986). See also
Procurement Code, supra note 186, art. III (special treatment for developing countries).
189. Cf. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 1174-75. Eastern bloc countries
import and export through foreign trade organizations, each of which handles a specific range
of goods. See generally Barrett, East Bloc Counts on Counter Trade, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1987,
at 465, 468. Developing countries too channel international trade through state-sponsored
monopolies; India's State Trading Corporation is a leading example. See generally Behara,
Can Countertrade Achieve its Promise?, TRADE FIN., Mar. 1988, at 49. For the purposes of
this discussion, state trading enterprises also include any enterprise receiving from a govern-
ment "exclusive or special privileges" within the meaning of GATT, supra note 5, art.
XVII(l)(a). The very difficult problem of determining which enterprises are subject to the
terms of article XVII, see generally J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 14.4, is beyond the scope of
this article.
190. See, eg., J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 1175.
191. Gadbaw, supra note 119, at 361.
192. GATT, supra note 5, art. XVII(l)(a).
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ports or exports by private traders." 193 Article XVII further provides
that this obligation is fulfilled if the enterprise acts "solely in accordance
with commercial considerations."
194
The state trading article presents "major interpretive difficulties," 19
and a relevant body of case law has not emerged. 196 Apparently, the
contracting parties continue to manifest a "desire... to avoid the tough
questions in dealing with state trading."'19 7 It is clear that article XVII
does not impose a national treatment requirement on state enterprises.1
98
"Thus the enterprise is entitled to discriminate between domestic and
foreign products in its purchases or its sales, as long as it does so on an
MFN basis." 19 9 Countertrade in general does not violate the most fa-
vored nation principle;2" furthermore, the article XVII MFN require-
ment is a weak one.20' Hence, article XVII does not prohibit
countertrade.2 °2
Instead, it must be asked whether a nation may do through a state
trading activity what it cannot do otherwise under GATT.2 3 In light of
the foregoing discussion, there is a distinct possibilily that countries can
use the state trading provisions as a safe harbor for countertrade. If
countertrade comports with commerical considerations including price,
quality, or marketability, it may comply with the MFN principle.2"
What is more, state enterprises are entitled to take tied loans into ac-
count as commercial considerations,2"5 and countertrade may be concep-
193. Id.
194. Id. art. XVII(l)(b).
195. Gadbaw, supra note 119, at 362.
196. Gadbaw, supra note 119, at 362. See J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 14.5.
197. Gadbaw, supra note 119, at 362. See Roessler, supra note 120, at 606,
198. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 1182. See also Canadian FIRA,
supra note 149, at 163 ("The Panel saw great force in Canada's argument that only the most-
favoured-nation and not the national treatment obligations fall within the scope of the general
principles referred to in Article XVII:I(a).") (dictum); Roessler, supra note 120, at 606; Lleb-
man, supra note 120, at 256-57.
199. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 1182. See Roessler, supra note 120, at
606.
200. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
201. E.g., Liebman, supra note 120, at 256-57.
202. Contra Gadbaw, supra note 119, at 362. Gadbaw asserts, with no discernible support,
that "a strong case can be made that countertrade involves both discriminatory effects and
considerations alien to those present in normal commercial transactions in violation of Article
VII." Id.
203. J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 14.3.
204. See GATT, supra note 5, art. XVII(l)(b). Arguably, the article XVII provision
preempts application of the stronger article I MFN obligation.
205. Id. annex I (Ad Article XVII). A tied loan occurs when one country lends money to
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tualized as a tied loan.2" 6
3. Subsidies
A few writers have tentatively suggested that countertrade may vio-
late the export subsidies provisions of the GATT and the Subsidies
Code.2 07 This area is complex;2 °0 only an introduction to the issues will
be attempted here.
The original General Agreement contained only one paragraph of
obligations concerning subsidies.1° 9 That paragraph contained a broad
subsidy definition, but imposed no obligation beyond a notification re-
quirement. The 1954-1955 GATT review session added four more sub-
stantive paragraphs to article XVI,210 but the revisions were only
accepted by developed countries.211 Thus, until the conclusion of the
Tokyo Round, the net effect of article XVI outside the industrialized
countries was minimal.2 12 The Subsidies Code sought to remedy these
weaknesses, but has been signed by only eleven LDCs and not a single
nonmarket country.213  "Consequently, most GATT members are not
obligated to refrain from the use of export subsidies. 214
For those that are obligated, the Subsidies Code imposes two princi-
pal rules. First, "[s]ignatories shall not grant export subsidies on prod-
another country on the condition that the money be spent on goods from the lending country.
J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 12.6.
206. Liebman, supra note 120, at 257-58.
207. Czinkota & Talbot, supra note 117, at 161; Liebman, supra note 120, at 255-56;
Comment, supra note 60, at 335-36. Violation of the provisions that give rise to claims for
compensation must be distinguished from actions that are not prohibited and are merely coun-
tervailing. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 711. See GATT, supra note 5, art. VI;
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles YI, XYI and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, BISD, supra note 5, 26th Supp., at 56, pt. 1 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Subsidies Code].
208. See, eg., J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 724.
209. Eg., id. at 727. See also GATT, supra note 5, art. VI (countervailing duties). That
paragraph is now id. art. XVI(A)(1).
210. GATT, supra note 5, art. XVI(1)-(5). Even the obligations in these paragraphs are
best described as "tentative." J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 15.3.
211. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 728 & n.4.
212. See id.
213. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 330 (as of Feb. 24, 1986). In light of
this discussion and a recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, it
seems clear that nonmarket economies are subject to no obligations whatsoever under GATT
with respect to subsidies. See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed.
Cir. 1986). In Georgetown Steel, the court held that certain imports from Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and the Soviet Union were not subject to the anti-subsidies provisions of the Tariff Act
of 1930, as amended. The court reasoned that the concept of unfair export subsidies cannot
exist for imports from nonmarket economies. Id. at 1314-15.
214. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 728 (footnote omitted).
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ucts other than certain primary products. ' 215 Second, "signatories agree
not to grant directly or indirectly any export subsidy on certain primary
products in a manner which results in the signatory granting such sub-
sidy having more than an equitable share of world export trade in such
product. .. 26 Rather than attempt to define "export subsidy," the
Code provides an illustrative list,2 17 which does not include countertrade
explicitly. Given the wide divergence of views on the subject,218 it would
be very difficult to assemble a consensus that countertrade represents an
impermissible export subsidy.
219
Two commentators have suggested that countertrade, in and of it-
self, is an export subsidy.220 First, countertrade may involve a govern-
mental purchase of imports at a price greater than the market price.
221
The resulting "bonus," this argument asserts, may find its way into the
price of the tied exports. The purported bonus, however, is much more
attenuated than any "charge on the public account" in the Subsidies
Code's illustrative list. The whole transaction increases imports, a result
diametrically opposed to the GATT concern with import-inhibiting sub-
sidies.222 The heightened payment for imports may better be viewed as
facilitating trade by defraying costs associated with market failure.
223
Second, according to another writer, countertrade is "conceivably" a spe-
cies of currency retention scheme.224 This is unintelligible.225
215. Subsidies Code, supra note 207, art. 9(1).
216. Id. art. 10(1).
217. Id. art. 9(2). See id. annex. The list is quite broad, and contains a catch-all phrase,
designed to encompass "[a]ny other charge on the public account constituting an export sub-
sidy in the sense of article XVI of the General Agreement." Id.
218. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 724.
219. Liebman, supra note 120, at 256.
220. Countertrade cannot be an impermissible production subsidy. See generally Subsidies
Code, supra note 207, art. 2.
221. Czinkota & Talbot, supra note 117, at 161.
222. See GATT, supra note 5, art. XVI(1).
223. See, eg., supra text accompanying note 87. According to one observer, the GATT
seeks only to proscribe "pure" export subsidies. See Comment, supra note 60, at 336. Subsi-
dies that alleviate internal anti-competitive rigidities faced by exporti-rs-"compensatory" ex-
port subsidies-are consistent with the GAIT. Id. Countertrade functions as a compensatory
subsidy because it alleviates market imperfections that restrict exports. See supra Section lI.B.
224. Liebman, supra note 120, at 255. See Subsidies Code, supra note 207, annex (example
(b)).
225. It is true that a government countertrade policy might include a currency retention
scheme. See Czinkota & Talbot, supra note 117, at 161. See also Comment, supra note 60, at
335 (India grants credits to, and reduces taxes for, companies that promote exports through
countertrade). The scheme would provide an impermissible subsidy, regardless of whether
export transactions involved countertrade. Countertrade, however, does not constitute a cur-
rency retention scheme, nor does it encourage the use of export subsidies.
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Even if a country is bound by GATT subsidies obligations, and even
if its countertrade practices constitute an export subsidy, the practices
may still come within the developing countries provisions of the Subsi-
dies Code." 6 Specifically, the Code recognizes "that subsidies are an in-
tegral part of economic development programmes of developing
countries,"22 7 disclaims any intention of preventing LDCs from assisting
their export sectors, and distinctly softens the ban on export subsidies
related to nonprimary products.22 8 Thus, countertrade does not violate
the GATT provisions on subsidies.
4. Miscellaneous Provisions
Countertrade could possibly violate various other GATT provisions
that will now be reviewed briefly. At the center of the system of GATT
obligations lies the tariff concession, which commits a contracting party
"to levy no more than a stated tariff on a particular item."229 Article II
"requires state import monopolies not to resell imported goods at a mo-
nopoly premium that is higher than the applicable tariff" contained in
the schedule of concessions." It can be argued that countertrade prac-
ticed by an import monopoly may violate the principles of article H.l1 t
However, countertrade is a means of permitting imports under adverse
conditions. The import monopoly provisions of article II, moreover, are
almost wholly inapplicable to Eastern and Southern countries. 3 2
Because countries often require countertrade without publishing
standards, they may also violate the transparency rules set forth in article
X.13 This is not a serious problem, however, because article X is impo-
tent in practice. 4 A related complaint is that countertrade conceals
dumping,235 but the price and volume details of most countertrade deals
226. Subsidies Code, supra note 207, art. 14.
227. Id. art. 14(1).
228. Id. art. 14(2).
229. J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 10.1.
230. Baker & Cunningham, supra note 120, at 377.
231. Gadbaw, supra note 119, at 360, 363.
232. Baker & Cunningham, supra note 120, at 377 (Article 11(4) is "plainly unenforceable
in centrally planned economies"); infra notes 249-251 and accompanying text (discussion of
accession protocols); J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 1141 (scope of article 11
limited because many developing countries have very short tariff schedules or no schedule at
all). Countertrade and barter may be more difficult to value for customs purposes. For a
discussion of applicable rules, see Roessler, supra note 120, at 612-13.
233. Comment, supra note 60, at 325. See GATT, supra note 5, art. X(1).
234. Article X has not been used much. See J. JACKsON, supra note 117, § 17.7. Con-
tracting parties are unlikely to invoke the GATT dispute resolution procedures solely to force
a countertrading member to publish standards.
235. See, eg., Impact of Countertrade, supra note 41, at 33-34 (statement of James P.
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are no less transparent than those of cash transactions. 236
Countertrade does not violate any of the key provisions of the
GATT directed against quantitative restrictions, discrimination, or subsi-
dies. Nonetheless, if countertrade policies nullify or impair any benefit
accruing to a contracting party under the GATT, that party may seek
corrective, retaliatory, or compensatory relief.237 Even if countertrade
could theoretically come within the nullification and impairment provi-
sion, it is inconceivable that a GATT action will be brought solely on this
basis.238
5. Countertrade, the GATT, and the Integration of World Trade
The preceding sections demonstrate that restrictive GATT provi-
sions should be read to tolerate countertrade as a second-best policy.
Most demands for countertrade come from governments in nonmarket
countries or developing countries. The fact that these countries are not
well integrated into the GATT system complicates analysis. 239 However,
countertrade allows countries not only to overcome the integration prob-
lem, but also to complement and supplement the GATT legal regime.
This section considers the legality of Eastern bloc countertrade policies
and then suggests that there should be a developing country exception
for countertrade.
Moore, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce). Dumping is governed by article VI and
the Agreement on Implementation ofArticle VI of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade,
BISD, supra note 5, 26th Supp., at 171 (1980) [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Code]. These provi-
sions do not make dumping a violation, and "the General Agreement does not impose on
contracting parties the obligation to prevent enterprises from dumping." Canadian FIRA,
supra note 149, at 164. Rather, the GAT authorizes self-help in the form of countervailing
duties. GAiT, supra note 5, art. VI; Anti-Dumping Code, supra, art. 8. Neither does counter-
trade render dumping more likely. See Banks, supra note 6, at 176-77,
236. Banks, supra note 6, at 176. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (countertrade
often transacted at market prices, through market channels). With respect to nonmarket econ-
omies, it is difficult to determine prices regardless of whether couatertrade is used. Banks,
supra note 6, at 171.
237. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIII; Roessler, supra note 120, at 612; Comment, supra
note 60, at 341.
238. Article XXIII is so broad as to be weak, J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at
352, and defective, id. at 345-46. Suspension of concessions requires a majority vote of con-
tracting parties, which is difficult to obtain. Id. at 336. Members have been reluctant to bring
article XXIII actions for fear of offending other members. Id. Not surprisingly, there has
been only one article XXIII case involving the actual suspension of concessions, Jackson,
GAT Machinery and the Tokyo Round Agreements in TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980S (W,
Cline ed. 1983), excerpted in id at 333-36.
239. See supra note 126.
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a. Nonmarket Economies
Beyond the state trading provisions previously discussed,24° the
body of the GATT does not even seek to address the problem of planned
economies. 24 1 Nonetheless, commentators have suggested that the so-
cialist countries violate the most favored nation principle of the General
Agreement by imposing countertrade requirements on traders in market-
oriented countries.24 2 The argument is that nonmarket countries do not
practice countertrade among themselves.243
This argument is flawed. First, Eastern European countries use
countertrade precisely because it "approximates the trading methods of
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance." 2' Second, "because of
the difficult political questions raised by [the MFN] question, it was
largely not treated in" the nonmarket countries' accession protocols.24
Third, the countertrade practices of Czechoslovakia and Hungary do not
pose much of a threat to GATT norms because these practices cause
little or no deviation from ordinary market transactions. 2 " Fourth, the
regional integration exception of article XXIV may insulate intra-CMEA
trade from operation of the MFN principle.24 Finally, the scope of any
240. See supra notes 189-206 and accompanying text.
241. Gadbaw, supra note 119, at 363.
242. See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 120, at 253.
243. Id.
244. de Miramon, supra note 46, at 348. Yugoslavia, although not a CMEA member,
maintains clearing arrangements with the Eastern Bloc countries.
245. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 1187. See Protocolfor the Accession of
Hungary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, BISD, supra note 5, 20th Supp., at 3
(1974); Protocol for the Accession of Romania to the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade,
BISD, supra note 5, 18th Supp., at 5 (1972) [hereinafter Romania Protocol]; Protocol for the
Accession of Poland, BISD, supra note 5, 15th Supp., at 46 (1968) [hereinafter Poland Proto-
col]. Yugoslavia's accession was thought not to raise similar problems, see J. JACKSON & W.
DAVEY, supra note 115, at 1183, and that country has long been treated as a full contracting
party, see K KOCK, supra note 123, at 217-18. Cuba and Czechoslovakia joined the GAIT
while they still had market economies. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 1183.
246. Czechoslovakia is not a major practitioner of countertrade, and its products are easily
sold on world markets. Vogt & Nowak, Countertrade-As Practiced in Eastern Europe, in
BARTER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 87 (B. Fisher & K. Harte eds. 1985). The Hungarian
government encourages countertrade only when the Western partner has access to appropriate
marketing. USITC (1985), supra note 3, at 126 app. 1. See also Vogt & Nowak, supra, at 88-
89 (government publicly opposes countertrade in other instances). Hungarian countertrade has
many market features; "the Hungarian motivation for countertrade emanates more from a
desire to develop the economy than from a rigid adherence to bilateral balancing...." Id. at
89.
247. Liebman, supra note 120, at 254. Yugoslavia, which is not a CMEA member, id.,
presents special problems. Yugoslavia's bureaucracy operates so as to require countertrade
unofficially for almost all imports, and countertrade is managed at the provincial level. USITC
(1985), supra note 3, at 129. Information on the countertrade practices of Cuba is scarce.
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such discrimination is limited by the small number of nonmarket con-
tracting parties.248 Any possible violation of MFN by nonmarket coun-
tries' countertrade practices would be insignificant. Indeed, the
accession protocols may exempt certain socialist countries from opera-
tion of GATT nondiscrimination rules.249 The protocols focus solely on
raising the volume of imports from other GATT members.250 Therefore,
Romania and Poland may be absolutely free to countertrade on a dis-
criminatory basis, so long as they comply with the provision of their ac-
cession protocols requiring import growth.25'
There exist fundamental problems in integrating nonmarket econo-
mies into the GATT legal framework.252 National treatment, the ban on
quantitative restrictions, subsidies, and tariff reductions have no meaning
in planned economies which set import and export levels in advance.253
On the other hand, the GATT, both as an institution and as a body of
rules, strives to integrate socialist countries into the world economy
through international trade. Countertrade acts as an interface between
East and West and therfore supports GATT objectives. 254 Adopting the
approach of the Polish or Romanian accession protocols-obligating so-
cialist countries only to demonstrate increased imports as a measure of
trade liberalization-is a more sensible way of dealing with East-West
trade than struggling to apply GATT rules to countertrade.2 "
b. A Developing Country Exception for Couintertrade
Sprinkled throughout the GATT are provisions that soften key obli-
gations for developing countries.25 6 Recognizing that a piecemeal ap-
proach would not sufficiently address the problems and concerns of the
248. See supra note 137.
249. See Baker & Cunningham, supra note 120, at 377-78; protocols cited supra note 245.
See also id. (no MFN in protocols).
250. Baker & Cunningham, supra note 120, at 377. See Poland Protocol, supra note 245, at
52 annex B (obligation to increase total imports from contracting parties 7% per annum);
Romania Protocol, supra note 245, at 10 annex B (obligation to increase total imports from
contracting parties in proportion to increase in total imports, as provided in national plan).
251. Baker & Cunningham, supra note 120, at 377.
252. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 1180.
253. Id.
254. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
255. Baker & Cunningham, supra note 120, at 378 ("Unless GATr members are willing to
search out and proscribe all of the countless subtle ways by which a state-controlled economy
can discriminate against particular countries or can limit particular classes of imports, it
makes little sense to attack countertrade on the ground that it may be used for these
purposes.").
256. See, eg., supra note 161 (balance of payments safeguard); supra notes 226-228 and
accompanying text (subsidies). See generally Comment, supra note 60.
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developing world, the drafters incorporated article XVIII, which is de-
voted entirely to government assistance for economic development. 257
When that article proved insufficient,258 the contracting parties adopted
part IV (trade and development) of the GATT. 59 Despite continuing
efforts by the membership of GAIT,2 ° LDCs remain extremely
dissatisfied.261
The GATT will never fully address the problems of development.
The document largely presumes free international markets. The GAIT
assumes that trade in goods is separable from other international eco-
nomic issues like foreign investment. Consequently, the GAIT is bound
to a static view of comparative advantage. But in today's world, compar-
ative advantage can be manipulated; governments channel investment
and create trade.262 In the final analysis, GATT rules presume that gov-
ernmental controls are uneconomic; that is to say, they will be exercised
to reduce trade and economic advantages. 63
As a key development tool,26" countertrade mediates between the
laissez-faire principles and the economic development articles of the
GAIT. Article XVIII and part IV can and should support a general
exception for countertrade as a development policy.2 65
Article XXXVI, which contains the principles and objectives of the
GATT rules on trade and development, reads like a catalog of the goals
of LDCs served by countertrade as a second-best policy:266 increased
257. See generally J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 25.1.
258. Id. § 25.4.
259. GAIT, supra note 5, arts. XXXVI-XXXVIII. Part IV entered into force in 1966. J.
JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 1143.
260. See, eg., J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 1154-66 (General System of
Preferences).
261. See, eg., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, REPORT
BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF UNCTAD: ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS OF THE MUL-
TILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1982), excerpted in id. at 144-49 (from perspective of
developing countries, results of Tokyo Round were wanting in many respects).
262. G. WINHAM, supra note 126, at 404-05.
263. J. JACKSON, supra note 117, § 14.1. Accord G. WiNHAM, supra note 126, at 405.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 102-103.
265. There may already be a de facto GAIT exception for LDCs. See J. JACKSON & W.
DAVEY, supra note 115, at 1141 (GAIT tends to overlook LDC actions that are technically
inconsistent with GAT obligations). The General Agreement provides general exceptions
which may be applicable to particular countertrade policies. See GATT, supra note 5, art.
XIX (escape clause); Liebman, supra note 120, at 258 (escape clause is easily invoked and may
apply to countertrade). See also GAT, supra note 5, art. XX (general exceptions); id. art.
XXI (security exceptions).
266. GAT, supra note 5, art. XXXVI. See also id. art. XXXVIII Goint action for devel-
opment). Cf. Comment, supra note 60, at 320 (countertrade may raise standard of living of
LDCs and further aims of GATT part IV). Part IV largely favors "less-developed countries," a
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export earnings, 267 greater access to world markets for primary2 68 and
nontraditional goods, 269 fair terms-of-trade,270  diversification of ex-
ports,27 1 stabilization of trade flows, 272 and interrelationship of trade and
aid 273 -in sum, economic development.274  Article XXXVIII requires
contracting parties to collaborate to further these objectives.273 For ex-
ample, parties must act
to provide improved and acceptable conditions of access to world mar-
kets for primary products of particular interest to less developed con-
tracting parties and to devise measures designed to stabilize and
improve conditions of world markets in these products including meas-
ures designed to attain stable, equitable and remunerative prices for
exports of such products.276
Countertrade fits well with this obligation. Moreover, countertrade as a
development policy is far less distortionary than protective devices, such
as import quotas, that are commonly used by less-developed contracting
parties.277 Barter-like trade does not break the link between domestic
deceptive term for a very diverse group of countries. The General Agreement provides a two-
part test for defining an LDC: A contracting party is considered an LDC if its "economy can
only support low standards of living and is in the early stages of development. GAT, supra
note 5, art. XVIII(4)(a). See id annex I (article XVIII) (definition includes parties "undergo-
ing a process of industrialization to correct an excessive dependence on primary production").
Therefore, most Eastern parties, though concerned with economic development, are not auto-
matically afforded differential treatment. But see id. art. XVIII(4)(b), (22) (p~arty in process of
development, but not coming within scope of id. art. XVIII(4)(a), may apply for differential
treatment); Liebman, supra note 120, at 260 & n.49 (Romania may be LDC for GATr
purposes).
267. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXXVI(1)(a), (2).
268. Id. art. XXXVI(4). See id. arts. XVIII(5) & XXXVII.
269. Id. art. XXXVI(5). See also supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text.
270. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXXVI(l)(b), (4). See also supra note 107 and accompany-
ing text.
271. GATr, supra note 5, art. XXXVI(5). See also supra text accompanying note 105.
272. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXXVI(4). See also supra note 91 and accompanying text.
273. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXXVI(6). See also supra note 105 and accompanying text.
274. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXXVI(l)(a). See id. art. XVIII(1). See also supra notes
102-109 and accompanying text.
275. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXXVIII(1) (parties "may enable less-developed con-
tracting parties to use special measures to promote their trade and development"); id. art.
XXXVIII(1)(f).
276. Id. art. XXXVIII(2)(a).
277. See I. OUTrERS-JAEGER, supra note 1, at 58 ("Although both political and economic
reasons have been instrumental in the decision of developing countries to carry out a more or
less large part of their foreign trade on a barter-like basis, it appears that economic problems
have been most decisive.").
Less-developed countries often use quotas to launch infant industries. See generally J,
JACKSON, supra, note 117, § 13.2.
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and world prices.2 78 Countertrade is also more effective as a development
tool than are protective devices.2 79 To apply the restrictive provisons of
the GATT against development-targeted countertrade would be hypo-
critical and counterproductive.
B. Summary
To summarize, countertrade in and of itself is unlikely to violate the
restrictive provisions of the General Agreement. Countertrade does not
constitute a quantitative restriction, nor does it violate the GATT norm
of nondiscrimination as embodied in the most favored nation and na-
tional treatment principles. Countertrade policies do not confer an im-
permissible subsidy. Even if covered by these or other restrictive
provisions, barter-like trade may benefit from specific exceptions embed-
ded in the substantive law of GATT. When GATT rules reach out to
cover state trading enterprises or nonmarket economies, they are more
likely to authorize than to limit countertrade. Finally, bilateral trade in
the service of economic development may be exempt from operation of
the primary GATT norms.
There remain other practical considerations relevant to pursuing
countertrade under the rules of GATT. Contracting parties may, with
relative ease, obtain waivers of obligations.280 "[T]here is the final practi-
cal consideration of how a potentially real violation of the GATT can be
pursued and remedied," '281 because the GATT dispute resolution appara-
tus is cumbersome and weak.28 2 For all these reasons, it is clear that
"the GATT does little to regulate countertrade demands."28
V. COUNTERTRADE AND THE GATT SYSTEM
Recognizing this, critics have suggested an institutional response-
revising the GATT to regulate countertrade.284 The United States Gov-
erfment has even insisted on early discussion of countertrade in the new
Uruguay Round of trade talks.285 There is, however, little chance that
the contracting parties will be able to agree on measures regulating
278. See supra text accompanying notes 150-55.
279. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
280. Liebman, supra note 120, at 260-61. See GATT, supra note 5, art. XXV(5). No party
has ever requested a waiver to permit countertrade. Liebman, supra note 120, at 260.
281. Liebman, supra note 120, at 261.
282. See generally J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 337-57.
283. Baker & Cunningham, supra note 120, at 376.
284. See, eg., Verdun, supra note 2, at 214.
285. GAT Finds Over 120 Trade Restrictions Against its Rules, Several of them Recent, 3
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 842 (June 25, 1986).
1988]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
countertrade.286
Experts consider amending the GATT to be nearly impossible.287
Equally unlikely would be a new countertrade side-agreement negotiated
under the aegis of the GATT and patterned after the MFN Codes.2 88
First, the countertrade issue cuts to the heart of stubborn GATT policy
dilemmas, especially the treatment of poorer countries, development, and
nonmarket economies; predictably, there is a wide divergence of views on
the subject.289 Second, countertrade is a minor 290 and low-priority291 is-
sue for GATT members. Third, perhaps because all countries use barter,
no country is likely to push the countertrade issue seriously at GATT
negotiations. 292 Finally, any side-agreement would only be enforceable
by and against signatories. Past experience indicates that Eastern and
Southern countries would be very reluctant to sign.293
Thus, the contracting parties are not likely to act affirmatively to
bring countertrade within the GATT legal framework, nor should they.
Countertrade as a second-best policy is consistent with the goals of the
GATT. As has recently been observed,
there is no reason for GATT to take a strong stand against prolifera-
tion of countertrade, or to attempt to officially bring it under its juris-
diction by issuing guidelines and regulations. [I]t may be the only
practicable solution to current world trade dislocations.... Prolifera-
tion of countertrade is a symptom of world economic difficulty rather
286. BUSINESS INT'L CORP., supra note 2, at 36.
287. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 115, at 310-11.
288. See, eg., Subsidies Code, supra note 207.
289. Parry, supra note 80, at 40 (quoting Felipe Jaramillo, Colombian Ambassador to the
GATT and leading Third World spokesman, who expressed "doubts as to the legality of bring-
ing [countertrade] under GATT"). See Czinkota & Talbot, supra note 117, at 167.
290. BUSINESS INT'L CORP., supra note 2, at 34 (GATT officials consider countertrade a
minor issue, now and in the future, for all contracting parties except possibly the United
States.).
291. Czinkota & Talbot, supra note 117, at 168 (higher priorities include technology trans-
fer and services).
292. Id. at 167. The only real candidate is the United States. However, the American
Government intends to continue bartering "in situations which offer advantages not offered by
conventional market operations," Impact of Countertrade, supra note 41, at 49 (attachment I)
(Statement of Charles H. Blum, acting Assistant United States Trade Representative for In-
dustrial Trade Policy), and its overall countertrade policy is inconsistent. McVey, Policy Issues
in Countertrade, in BARTER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 272 (S. Fisher & K. Harte eds, 1985).
See generally Note, Bauxite for Butter: The U.S.-Jamaican Agreement and the Future of Bar.
ter in US. Trade Policy, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 239 (1984).
293. See supra text accompaning notes 188 (no Eastern country and only one LDC has
signed the Government Procurement Code) and 213 (no Eastern country and only eleven
LDCs signed the Subsidies Code).
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than the problem itself.2 94
If a contracting party challenges countertrade requirements via the
GATT dispute resolution apperatus, the panel should ask whether the
requirements operate as a second-best policy. If so, the panel should find
that the countertrade policy does not violate GATT rules. If instead the
requirements are intended solely to restrict trade,295 the panel should
proceed as it would for any other violation of a GATT obligation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Countertrade is the contractually explicit linkage of commercial im-
port and export transactions. Although variations are endless, there are
three main types of countertrade: classical barter, commercial compensa-
tion, and industrial compensation.
Each type of countertrade is fundamentally inefficient, according to
the general equilibrium view that dominates the literature. General equi-
librium critics see countertrade as costly, inflexible, and uneconomic;
they conclude that it decreases international trade and distorts the alloca-
tion of resources.
The world economy, however, is not in general equilibrium. Illiquid-
ity and uncertainty prevail; information is imperfect; bureaucratic, polit-
ical, and ideological barries plague trade; national economies are
underdeveloped. Under these conditions of market failure, the theory of
the second best states that steps toward freer, "cash" trade are not neces-
sarily desirable. Countertrade overcomes market rigidities and thus per-
mits international trade which would not otherwise take place.
Countertrade as a second-best policy is efficient. Generally, trade-en-
hancing effects outweigh trade-diverting effects.
Critics in the general equilibrium tradition necessarily assert that
reciprocal trading arrangements violate the spirit and letter of the
GATT. Because the General Agreement itself is a second-best system,
however, countertrade supplements and complements the existing legal
framework governing world trade.
Not surprisingly, then, the restrictive GATE provisions do not pro-
hibit countertrade. Moreover, the scope of these provisions is limited by
explicit exceptions and lack of consensus. GATE rules do not satisfacto-
rily address the special problem of international trade and development
in nonmarket and developing economies. Countertrade actually helps to
integrate these economies into the GATT legal system.
294. Czinkota & Talbot, supra note 117, at 173.
295. See supra notes 71, 161.
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The contracting parties could try to bring barter-like trade within
the sphere of GATT regulation, but any such amendments or side-agree-
ments would be unwarranted and unlikely. If any country elects to com-
plain formally, the contracting parties should view second-best
countertrade policies as consistent with the letter and spirit of the
GATT.
Countertrade's brisk growth has engendered two related kinds of
confusion among commentators. First, the failures of the multilateral
payments system spur countertrade, which seems to undermine that sys-
tem. Second, countertrade appears to violate the spirit of the GATT, but
the GATT is powerless to regulate countertrade. This confusion can be
resolved: countertrade as a second-best policy is consistent with the
goals of international legal norms because it helps the international econ-
omy to overcome the trade-reducing effects of market failure.
